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John Perry laid out an argument that he believes falsified the structured theory of propositions. He claims that indexicals 
cannot be accounted for by this theory. I maintain that indexicals are unproblematic for structured proposition theory, and that 
Perry has mistakenly presupposed that knowledge is ‘black or white’ – one either knows or does not know – rather than 
adopting a more subtle definition of knowledge. I also argue that he further presupposed that humans will reason perfectly. 
Disputing this assumption and defining knowledge accurately resolve the issues posed by Perry. Some consequences of my 




John Perry in “The Problem of the Essential Indexical” outlines what he considers a problem for the 
characterization of belief: the problem of context-sensitive words such as ‘I,’ ‘he,’ etc. which designate a 
particular person at a particular time, and yet seem to lack the proposition structure of a sentence 
containing a proper name such as ‘John’ or ‘Sally.’ Such words are called indexicals. I consider such 
words neither essential nor a problem for philosophy of language; they merely demonstrate a point about 
human knowledge, or a lack thereof. I follow Scott Soames and Nathan Salmon in my constructive 
proposal. 
 
Perry attacks the theory of structured propositions, which defines belief as “a relation between subjects 
and propositions conceived as bearers of truth and falsity.”1 Such a theory requires that if propositions 
assert the same thing, then one believes all of them are true or believes all of them are false. For instance, 
I believe ‘I am writing an essay’ if and only if I believe ‘Landon is writing an essay.’ Perry thinks this 
theory runs aground when indexicals are involved. For example, when another person subscribes to the 
belief ‘Landon is writing an essay.’ This person obviously need not believe ‘I am writing an essay’ to 
believe I am writing an essay. So the ‘if and only if’ is a false statement. It follows that the equivalence 
holds only for certain individuals or contexts for assertions with indexicals. This indicates that the 
indexical is essential to the proposition’s content.2 In the instance where I characterized my belief, it is 
impossible to reiterate the same propositional content in different words. Furthermore, the theory of 
structured propositions cannot properly distinguish believers or context-sensitive statements. The theory 
is decidedly context-insensitive, which Perry believes is part of the problem. Perry claims this difficulty 
is insurmountable for the theory of structured propositions, since this theory requires that the above 
sentences assert the same thing in all cases. They supposedly do not. Perry’s evidence that these 
sentences assert different things is the possibility of believing one but not the other. 
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This evidence indicates that indexicals make propositions containing them, and hence belief in such 
propositions, relative to the individual, countermanding the context-insensitive theory of structured 
propositions. The problem gets worse. Perry gives this example: during his trip to a grocery store, he 
notices a pile of sugar on the floor and comes to believe a shopper has made a mess. He begins searching 
for said shopper, noticing the sugar trail getting bigger, until he finally realizes he is the shopper in 
question. He comes to believe ‘I am making a mess.’ The change of belief seems to be the only 
explanation for the change in Perry’s behavior. However, he already believed that some shopper had been 
making a mess. This contradicts the thesis that these propositions have the same content. Such a thesis 
entails that one believes ‘Some shopper is making a mess’ if and only if one believes ‘I am making a 
mess,’ since ‘I’ and ‘some shopper’ denote the same object: Perry.3 The issue is that these have the same 
content only in Perry’s case. For another person, ‘I’ denotes someone else, which makes the equivalence 
false. Perry gives other examples in which propositions are sensitive to time and location of the utterance, 
but they merely emphasize the above point. Indexicals bind a proposition to a unique individual, place, or 
time, and defy any attempt to make them context-insensitive propositions by removing the indexical or 
relative element characterizing the proposition, without which Perry’s change in behavior cannot be 
properly characterized.4 
 
So in the theory of structured propositions, the sentences ‘I am writing a paper’ and ‘Landon is writing a 
paper’ assert identical facts, and the truth of or belief in the one necessitates truth of or belief in the other. 
However, indexicals make propositional content relative to speakers, times, or places, seemingly in a way 
that cannot be imitated by non-indexicals. This causes two issues. First, the truth of an indexical sentence 
is not equivalent to the truth of a non-indexical one. Second, belief in an indexical sentence is not 
equivalent to belief in a non-indexical one.5 
 
Perry invokes the de re and de dicto distinction to illuminate this problem. It is true that when Perry 
believed some shopper has been making a mess, he also believed de re that he had been making a mess. 
He did not believe de dicto, though, that ‘I am making a mess.’ Perry’s claim is that the de dicto change 
of belief explains why he stopped looking for the messy shopper and attended to his own bag of sugar, 
not the de re belief which remained the same throughout.6 It is this property that the structured 
proposition theory had highlighted, but it confused de re with de dicto, mixing belief in one with belief in 
the other, violating the distinction between them.7 
 
I ignore Perry’s positive proposal of limited accessibility since my main interest is to argue that the issues 
delineated above are unproblematic for the theory of structured propositions. I think it indicates the 
necessity of defining one’s terms. I proceed to do this here. I will clarify what it means to know what a 
proposition asserts, what a propositional assertion is, and what is meant by belief. Clarifying these terms 
suffices to defend the structured proposition theory. 
 
What does it truly mean to know what a proposition asserts? ‘Know’ is a loaded term – there is not 
normally an immediate leap from ignorance to knowledge. The degrees of acquaintance with a concept or 
proposition may differ – one may have no idea what something means, one may have a vague idea of 
what something means, and so forth. If somebody says to me “Do you have the time?” in French, then I 
would have no idea what they meant. If they said the same thing in English, then I would have a very 
good idea of what they meant, though if they asked me subsequently, “Oh! So you know what time is, 
then! Do tell: what is it?” in English, I would be unable to elaborate upon that more technical subject. 
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Another example is language: one may vaguely know what ‘misanthrope’ means by its context, or know 
precisely what it means, or be ignorant of its meaning. The point at which a degree of acquaintance 
suffices for knowledge is contentious. That different degrees of acquaintance with something are possible 
seems clear. 
 
When does acquaintance become knowledge? This is where the present argument is deeply invested in 
the term. I borrow from Leibniz to distinguish the kinds of knowledge. He says: 
All knowledge is either obscure or clear, and clear knowledge is again confused or 
distinct; the distinct in its turn is either inadequate or adequate, and again either symbolic 
or intuitive. The most perfect knowledge is that which is both adequate and intuitive.8 
 
Leibniz further defines the terms used in establishing this hierarchy of knowing as follows: 
 
A notion is obscure when it does not suffice for the recognition of the represented thing … 
clear when it suffices to let me recognize the represented thing … confused when I am 
unable to enumerate separately the marks which are sufficient to distinguish this thing 
from others … distinct [when I can] distinguish it from all other similar [things] … 
inadequate when the single notions which compose them are in their turn clearly yet 
confusedly known … adequate when everything which enters a distinct notion is in its 
turn distinctly known … blind, or symbolic [when] we do not intuit simultaneously the 
whole nature of the thing; rather, we use signs instead of things […] knowing or believing 
that to give the explanation is in our power … I call the knowledge intuitive [when] of a 
distinct and primitive notion no other knowledge is possible [when the notion is primitive, 
that it, a mark of itself, or when it is irresolvable and can only be understood through 
itself, hence lacks elements.9 
 
This taxonomy of the species of acquaintance with a proposition allows one to better phrase what 
knowing a proposition actually means, rather than using that phrase to denote linguistic competence or 
something more ambiguous and undefined. Knowing a proposition means having adequate knowledge of 
it, either intuitive or symbolic. This means a person knows a proposition only when they know everything 
which enters into a distinct notion. In Leibniz’s words: 
 
... we cannot speak of a thing, understanding what we are saying, unless we have an idea 
of that thing. For frequently we understand very well the words we are using or remember 
having understood them before; yet because we content ourselves with this blind 
knowledge and do not pursue far enough into the analysis of notions, it happens that a 
contradiction which may be implied in the composite notion escapes us.10 
 
This precisely characterizes what occurs when indexical elements enter into an assertion. In the case of 
Perry holding contradictory beliefs, I argue that he does not understand what he believes. The content of 
the propositions do not differ due to some mystical property of indexicals. I think that if Perry had 
adequate knowledge of his belief, then he would know all the component elements, and not hold 
contradictory de dicto beliefs related to the same object. 
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More precisely, his grocery store example gives two assertions, “Some shopper is making a mess,” and “I 
am making a mess.” Perry believes one of the first two utterances and not the second utterance, despite 
the fact that both assertions claim something about the same object, namely because ‘I’ and ‘some 
shopper’ refer to Perry. Perry claims this poses a problem for the structured proposition theory; I claim 
this poses no problem whatsoever. Perry gains adequate knowledge of the proposition, which he lacked 
before. He had inadequate knowledge because he did not know all the component elements entering into 
the proposition, namely the referent of ‘some shopper,’ even though he could have identified a messy 
shopper on sight and understands the words he used. He then realizes that the belief ‘I am not making a 
mess’ – the evidence that he held this belief is that he looks for the messy shopper rather than fix his own 
cart – contradicts the fact that he is the shopper in question. 
 
I do not deny that Perry has linguistic competence. Linguistic competence does not suffice for 
understanding all utterances. Perry knows what ‘that man’ means in the abstract, how it functions as a 
semantic object. He understands the meaning of the phrase ‘that man.’ In this case, he lacks the 
knowledge of the referent of the phrase. Hence, his knowledge of ‘that man’ is incomplete. One may 
understand that the set of integers and the set of natural numbers are of infinite, with the dictionary 
definition of ‘infinity’ in my vocabulary. Yet let me be asked, “Are the set of integers and set of natural 
numbers of the same cardinality (size)?” Most individuals would reply no – but this is not because one 
lacks linguistic competence. This person knows enough to understand its mention or use in the contexts 
encountered so far. This person lacks adequate knowledge because they do not know everything which 
enters into this notion of infinity. 
 
This may give rise to a seemingly insurmountable obstacle for achieving knowledge of a thing. The 
above criterion for knowledge seems to be: only when you know every property of a thing do you 
actually know the thing, meaning that a couple married for 60 years do not truly know each other, simply 
because one of the pair has neglected to tell the other one that they lost their umbilical cord six days after 
birth, and the other in the pair has failed to make it known that they lost their umbilical cord on their 
birthday. I am comfortable with this conclusion. One must know every property of a thing before they 
have adequate knowledge of it. Intuition may recoil from this consequence. That does not suffice to show 
it is absurd.  
 
The avenue is open to a weaker notion of knowledge, to those who may find the one I accept 
objectionable. One may argue that adequate knowledge of a thing is either intuitive or symbolic. If one 
claims to have knowledge of a person, then one may have symbolic knowledge, meaning that one know 
his or her spouse because it is not necessary to intuit the entire nature of someone to know them. I do not 
need to intuit the entire concept of arithmetic when I add two natural numbers. The facts that addition (as 
usually defined) is commutative, associative, and so forth do not enter into the calculation. This does not 
entail that I lack such knowledge. I have symbolic knowledge of arithmetic when I ignore unrelated 
component notions. I may understand the other properties of arithmetic, but I need not summon them to 
add two numbers. This explains how a small child manages to add two numbers without recognizing the 
properties of arithmetic. The child has symbolic knowledge, not ‘adequate’ in the strong sense. Perhaps 
no one has that. 
 
One might argue my example is wholly different. In my example of symbolic knowledge, I have 
knowledge of how to add numbers and the ‘+’ operator’s properties. Yet in the example of the couple, 
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both clearly lack the respective facts about each other’s umbilical cord, and hence all facts true about the 
person. I accept this criticism, but I point out that the addition example gives properties entering into the 
‘+’ operator, not every property of the operator that we have selected. For instance, someone may change 
the addition operator to look like ‘&,’ and ask a child and I to describe what properties this operator has 
when defined to be equivalent to ‘+.’ I know that how its drawn does not change the abstract properties, 
but the child may not. I might list its properties whereas the child may be silent. Yet the child may be 
equally capable as I of addition of numbers of a small enough size. Not every fact about a thing enters 
into having symbolic knowledge of that thing, or so the argument may go. I need not know grass is green 
to know what grass is – a blind person is not barred from knowing what grass is in virtue of blindness. 
The question is which facts enter into a given notion. The answer to this may differ with notions, and be 
quite contentious. I will not embroil myself in such a discussion here. Adequate knowledge does not 
require knowing every detail about a thing, only the facts that ‘enter into’ it. So when evaluating the 
couple example against the addition operator example, one needs to ask if knowing the given fact enters 
into the thing or whether it does not – maybe whether the property is essential for knowledge. Again, 
what does enter into each concept may be its own debate, but the point only is that not every fact 
necessarily does. Someone happier with a weaker definition of ‘knowledge’ might prefer this line of 
argument. It is an interpretation differing from mine, so I leave it here. 
 
It likely requires more justification to satisfy the reader that this definition of knowledge is not 
impossible. That to know a person requires knowing every single fact about them may violate one’s 
belief that there are people he or she knows. Yet my position makes this knowledge more uncertain than 
is comforting. I am comfortable with this uncertainty, because such a conclusion merely indicates my 
pretensions to knowing a person, even a loved one, is ill-founded. I lack adequate knowledge of them. 
This only means that knowledge of another person is never perfect – that one never knows another person 
completely. This seems entirely adequate to describing the situation. No person has the time, interest, or 
memory capacity to commit to memory every single fact about, say, one’s spouse. Even if one had these 
resources, then there is no guarantee that one’s spouse would be at all interested in (or appreciative of) 
such involved data collection. Someone asking this of a spouse is more likely neurotic than a healthy 
companion. 
 
However, lacking adequate knowledge of one’s spouse does not entail that one cannot know enough to 
feel happy with them. I know enough about a hamburger to know it causes health problems, but ask me 
about the exact mechanics of how those health problems manifest, and what aspects of a hamburger 
cause these problems to manifest, and I will be quite unable to tell you. This means, naturally, that my 
knowledge of the hamburger is not adequate (also my knowledge of biology), but this does not at all 
imply that I cannot on some level, have some degree of knowledge, adequate enough to encourage 
avoiding burgers. Perhaps this constitutes clear, inadequate knowledge of the hamburger. That inquiry is 
beside the point. Individuals lack adequate knowledge in more areas than is typically or happily admitted, 
even in places where one may feel quite competent. My more rigorous notion of knowledge chides that 
one should not be so certain. Though I am not a skeptic, I am skeptical. 
 
Having dealt with knowledge of a proposition, one still needs to characterize what it means to believe a 
proposition. After this, Perry’s critiques may be fully analyzed, namely, whether he showed that the 
structured proposition theory is false with indexicals.  
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First, what it means to believe a proposition. I claim that to believe a proposition means to consider it to 
be true, or to say that it holds in the world (or the particular domain of discourse – say, imaginary 
creatures, or possible worlds, or theological realms).11 When a person subscribes to a proposition, they 
commit to ensuring both that it coheres with one’s system of knowledge and that there is a 
correspondence of that proposition to some worldly state of affairs. Believing a proposition is similar to 
taking on the defense of it. It may be helpful to think of this as a Tarskian semantic truth-definition: ‘a 
proposition ‘s’ is true if and only if s is true’.12 In the case of belief, one believes ‘s’ if and only if one 
believes s (that whatever s asserts is true). 
 
Given that I claim the propositions assert the exact same thing, how is it still possible to hold 
contradictory beliefs about equivalent propositions? Why does this occur frequently? If the belief in ‘s’ 
entails s, and ‘t’ asserts the same thing as ‘s’, then should not a belief in ‘t’ also be entailed by a belief in 
s, which is the same as t? This has been the critique of Perry. I answer that they do indeed entail the same 
thing, and that one who is logical and has adequate knowledge cannot avoid a belief in ‘t’ when one 
believes an equivalent proposition ‘s.’ Yet this has nothing to do with a person who lacks such 
knowledge – anybody can believe contradictory propositions, namely if they do not realize that they 
entail a contradiction. That does not mean that the propositions do not entail the same thing. Consider 
two tautologies from classical logic: 
 
[1] ((P v Q) & ~Q) → P 
[2] (((P & S) v Q) & (~Q & (T ↔ ~Y))) → P 
 
I might agree that [1] implies P, but I might contend at the same time that [2] does not entail P, despite 
the fact that both entail P. Nothing about knowledge precludes illogical behavior (aside from a minimal 
amount of consistency that human psychologically demands).13 Though both propositions imply P, my 
knowledge of the proposition’s components might be inadequate. This is how I end up holding 
contradictory beliefs. So Perry’s claim that changing beliefs indicate that propositions assert distinct 
things is answerable. My changing beliefs only imply my ignorance. 
 
People can hold contradictory beliefs because there are different degrees of knowledge. It is possible to 
lack the knowledge necessary to avoid confusion. Perry’s critiques no longer disprove the structured 
proposition theory. Taking this into consideration, it is easier to see what Perry has mistakenly attributed 
to the theory of structured propositions. Perry describes it as three claims:  
 
…the first is that belief is a relation between subject and an object [a proposition]… The 
second is that [propositions] have a truth-value in an absolute sense, as opposed to being 
merely true for a person or at a time. The third [is] for that S and that S’ to be the same… 
they must have the same truth-value.14 
 
Perry takes issue with the second claim, that a proposition is not true or false absolutely. “The sentence ‘I 
am making a mess’ doesn’t identify a proposition. For this sentence is not true or false absolutely, but 
only as said by one person or another.”15 But this is incorrect; the sentences are still true or false 
absolutely. The change in belief does not indicate that this is not the case. 
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What Perry points towards is that when anyone else says ‘I am making a mess,’ it is no longer the same 
proposition. The structured proposition theory is not false on that basis alone, as it asserts that 
propositions with the same content are equivalent, not that propositions with different content are 
equivalent. If I, being the author, say, ‘I am making a mess,’ it is no longer the same sentence as Perry’s, 
because the meaning of ‘I’ has changed. This is what Perry has identified as the inaccessible quality of 
indexicals.16 Yet Perry wrongly considers such propositions the same, even though they are distinct. This 
is the fault in his analysis. ‘I’ means two different things when said by two different people, so why 
should they be tied together? This problem does not mean that propositions are relative; ‘I am making a 
mess’ is as true as ‘Perry is making a mess,’ and others can say the latter, but not the former, because 
when a different person says ‘I,’ they say something different. That does not mean the propositions when 
said by Perry are different, or that the truth-values are relative. The truth-value will remain constant, 
though I cannot speak the same sentence. The same sentence will have the same truth value, spoken by 
any person. The problem lies in that it cannot be spoken by a different person with the same meaning. 
Should one fix the word ‘I’ to mean ‘Perry,’ then this would become more apparent, because ‘I am 
making a mess’ and ‘Perry is making a mess’ would mean the same thing when spoken by any person as 
when spoken by Perry. The problem is the propositions are different, not that the theory is false. 
 
As regards the third condition, that two sentences must have the same truth value to be the same, I find 
this conclusion agreeable. The truth-values will be the same, though one’s beliefs may be different due to 
lacking adequate knowledge. Humans happen to reason imperfectly. This is unrelated to whether 
propositions are the same or whether a person who believes one should believe the other. It simply means 
that it is possible – though not logical – to believe one and not the other. This is due to ignorance, not 
some qualitative difference among sentences. 
 
As an example of this, how might someone believe ‘Mark Twain is Mark Twain,’ as a trivial truth, yet 
deny that ‘Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens?’ The problem is not that these statements assert different 
truths. These propositions assert the same truth. The problem lies with a person’s knowledge. They are 
both trivial truths. It seems strange to say until one considers that to a person with adequate knowledge, 
both statements would seem trivial. It may be clearer if one considers an individual with perfect 
knowledge. The assertion would be obvious to someone with such knowledge. This indicates that the two 
propositions do indeed assert the same truth. Ignorance causes one sentence to seem ‘different’ or 
‘informative’ when it is not enlightening. These assertions seem different because one may dispel 
confusion about the reference of Samuel Clemens whereas the other may not. The distinction disappears 
when someone has adequate knowledge of Samuel Clemens. To such an individual, this would be 
uninformative. 
 
I find that Perry’s objections do not overturn the theory that belief is a relation between a subject and a 
proposition. This is because Perry has mistakenly considered indexical assertions identical in cases where 
they differ. Clarifying terms shows this to be the case. Now as for what a proposition is, I leave this 
unanswered here. That seems to be the gap left for the theory of structured propositions espoused here. 
That question is saved for another paper. 
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